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Abstract
We analyze a political competition model of redistributive policies. We provide an 
equilibrium existence result and a full characterization of the net transfers to the dif-
ferent income groups. We also derive several testable predictions about the way in 
which the net group transfers and the after-tax Gini coefficient vary with the main 
parameters of the model. In accordance with the theory, the empirical evidence 
from a sample of developed and developing democracies supports a highly statisti-
cally significant association between: (i) the net group transfer and the gap between 
the population and the group mean initial income, and (ii) the net group transfer 
(and resp., the Gini coefficient) and power sharing disproportionality. In addition, 
the data also provide some empirical evidence confirming a significant relationship 
between the net transfers to the poor (and resp., the Gini) and the concern of the 
political parties with income inequality.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid twenty century an increasingly important activity of government in 
western democracies consists in redistributing income among different socio-eco-
nomic groups. Quite often, this activity is not only motivated by the egalitarian goal 
of reducing income disparities among the citizens, but also by the tactical objectives 
of the political actors competing in the elections. In this paper, we study several 
determinants of redistributive policies, emphasising in particular the role of political 
power sharing, inequality concern, and partisanship. In addition, we confront our 
predictions to the data using a panel of developed and developing democracies.
Following recent research on social preferences and redistribution, pioneered by 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a, b),1 we first modify the canonical model of redis-
tributive politics due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) to allow voters to express a 
concern not just about their own well-being (e.g., disposable income), but also about 
the well-being of other members of society. This is consistent with data from labora-
tory experiments and neuro-imaging studies, which show that people are to some 
extent willing to sacrifice personal gains and share resources with others to mitigate 
economic inequalities.
In our model, the other-regarding concern enter into the voters’ and the par-
ties’ preferences over redistributive policies as a concern with egalitarianism, i.e., 
a dislike of unequal outcomes per se.2 This notion of social preferences matches 
closely the data used in the empirical part, which suggest consistently with Alesina 
and Giuliano (2010) that poorer groups of individuals posses a larger disutility from 
income inequality. It is worth noting that, in contrast with the inequity aversion con-
cept of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which expresses envy and altruism and is self-
centered,3 our idea of social preferences is rooted in Arrow’s (1963) tradition. That 
is, it is based on a “public-value” notion, as is referred to by Corneo and Gruner 
(2002), in the sense that individuals’ attitude towards income redistribution reflects 
some ideal or principle of social justice about how resources ought to be distributed 
in society.
Besides introducing inequality concern into the utility function, we also extend 
the redistribution model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) to accommodate a con-
tinuum of power sharing rules, ranging from purely proportional representation to 
winner-take-all. This is motivated by the fact that in modern democracies, politics 
is not “all or nothing”, but most often it requires consensus and compromise among 
multiple policymakers (Powell 2000; Franzese 2010; Lijphart 2012). For the results 
1 We discuss in greater detail the literature related to our paper in Sect. 5.
2 Experimental and neural evidence of egalitarian motives in humans strongly support the role of the 
anterior insula of the human brain (often associated with negative emotions such as pain and distress) in 
promoting egalitarian behavior (Dawes et al. 2007 and 2012).
3 By self-centerness we mean that fair-minded people in the inequity aversion sense is influenced by 
the comparison between their own payoffs and that of a reference group, but not by inequality per se, or 
by the differences among the payoffs of other individuals. Interestingly, experimental evidence seems to 
indicate that the opposite might happen in simple distribution games, where people seem to consider also 
differences among others in their utility functions (Engelmann and Strobel 2004).
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of the paper, the amount of policymaking power shared by fair-minded political 
actors turns out to be crucial for shaping not only the intensity of electoral competi-
tion, but also the equilibrium policy.
Following the modelling strategy of Saporiti (2014), Matakos et al. (2015), and 
Herrera et al. (2016), we represent power sharing in our framework with the help 
of a contest success function. This function is meant to reflect in a reduced-form the 
institutions of representation, governance, and policymaking (such as, separation of 
powers, the electoral system, forms of government, agenda-setting and veto pow-
ers, amendment procedures, etc.) that shape the mechanism that transforms the votes 
of the parties into the decision-making power or “influence” over the implemented 
policy.4 In our case, it specifically determines the post-election power of the politi-
cal parties as a function of their relative electoral strengths, i.e., in relation to their 
ratio of votes. The implemented policy is then defined as a compromise between the 
electoral proposals, each weighted by the party’s corresponding share of policymak-
ing power.5
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, we prove that, under fairly 
general conditions, our redistributive election game has a unique pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The proof rests on standard existence results for strategic games with a 
continuum of pure strategies. To guarantee the strict quasi-concavity of the condi-
tional payoff functions, which are continuous over the strategy space, we impose a 
sufficient condition that bears similarities with Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987).
To elaborate, in our model each party’s payoff function consists of two terms. The 
first term captures the concern of the party members with income inequality, and it 
is strictly concave in the party’s own strategy. The second term expresses the inter-
est of the professional politicians in policymaking power. This term is an increasing 
transformation of the party’s vote share function, and it does not need to be concave. 
It depends on the distribution of the partisan biases insight each voter group, the 
relative individual welfare associated with the redistributive policies of the parties, 
and the disproportionality with which political power is shared after the election.
The condition we establish to ensure equilibrium existence imposes ipso facto 
two restrictions on the second term of each party’s conditional payoff function. On 
the one hand, it constraints the disproportionality of power sharing taking into con-
sideration the shape of the vote share function. On the other hand, it demands that 
the (logarithmic) rate at which the percentage of votes of each party varies as result 
of changes in the relative welfare of the groups be limited by the overall concavity 
4 Influenced by the empirical part, along the paper we employ the terms power sharing and electoral 
rules interchangeably and without making a distinction between them. However, as Herrera et al. (2016) 
points out, the former should be viewed in the theory as a much broader concept, representing not (like 
electoral rules) simply the mapping from votes into seat shares in the legislature, but the relationship 
between the electoral outcomes and the parties’ direct influence over the policymaking process.
5 This assumption allows to abstract from the specificities of the (extensive-form) bargaining game that 
determines the implemented policy. Luckily, as Franzese (2010) points out, under complete information 
in any of these bargaining games the resulting equilibrium policy is a weighted-average combination of 
the policymakers’ (or parties’ in our case) most-preferred policies (platforms). Furthermore, this convex 
combination can be rationalized as the solution of a Nash bargaining process, where the optima of each 
of the players is weighted by its relative bargaining strength (Franzese 2010).
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of the voters’ utility function. This latter part guarantees that the party’s vote share 
is concave, but it is stronger than Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) condition, since 
inequality concern relates in a non-trivial way the margin vote share associated to 
each income group with the net transfers received by the other groups.
Second, to understand the nature of the pure-strategy equilibrium, we character-
ize the net transfers to the groups using the first-order conditions of each party’s 
constrained optimization problem. We show that both parties select the same tax-
and-transfer policy, which can be divided into two parts. The first part coincides 
with the optimal policy of a purely egalitarian party, and it is given by the difference 
or gap between the population and the group mean initial income. The second part 
represents the amount of tactical redistribution across income groups carried out for 
electoral purposes, and it depends on the interplay of three main factors: (i) the (rel-
ative) partisan independence of the poor, (ii) parties’ and voters’ inequality concern, 
and (iii) the electoral rule disproportionality.
Third, we derive from our equilibrium characterization a number of testable pre-
dictions that guide the empirical work. Among them, our analysis shows that the net 
transfers to all groups rise with the income gaps. Likewise, the gap between the par-
tisan independence of the poor and the average across all income groups increases 
the transfers to the poor and reduces income inequality. We also find that inequal-
ity concern curbs electoral redistribution and inequality, transferring resources from 
the middle class and the rich to the poorer segment of society. Interestingly, an 
effect in the opposite direction on the net group transfers is driven by power sharing 
disproportionality.
With regard to the after-tax income inequality, we prove that the Gini index after 
redistribution increases as policymaking power gets more concentrated in the major-
ity winning party. The latter as well as the effect of power sharing over the net trans-
fers take place if and only if parties are fair-minded, in which case the intensity of 
the electoral competition (determined by power sharing) affects parties’ willingness 
to trade off equity for votes. By contrast, if parties maximize simply the expected 
vote shares, targeted spending to the swing voter groups is not affected by the power 
sharing regime.
Finally, fourth, we confront the above predictions to the data using an unbalanced 
panel (depending on data availability) of developed and developing countries.6 Our 
paper adds in that regard to both, the empirical literature on the probabilistic vot-
ing model of income redistribution, and the empirical analysis of income inequal-
ity under different electoral rules. To start, we build a panel of countries and years 
based on information provided by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), from which 
we get the group transfers, their disposable incomes, and the Gini, and by a series of 
socio-economic and political datasets, from which we construct the other main vari-
ables of the model.
To elaborate, we use the European Social Survey to gather information about the 
extent to which voters consider that it is “important that people are treated equally 
and have equal opportunities”, which approximates our concept of voters’ inequality 
6 See Table 7 at the end of the paper for details about the observations informing the regressions.
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concern. This database also informs about the voters’ partisan alignment, which we 
employ to estimate the partisan independence within the income groups. On the 
other hand, to measure power sharing, we rely on the index of electoral rule dis-
proportionality due to Taagepera (1986), which fits well with our theoretical con-
cept.7 To construct the index, data on the total number of voters and parliamentary 
seats and the mean electoral district magnitude are obtained from various sources, 
including the Manifesto Project of Volkens et al. (2015) and Carey and Hix’s (2011) 
dataset.8
We then carry out a series of regressions, accounting for country-specific, time-
invariant fixed effects (FE) when the sample size allows, and conducting pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) otherwise. As happens with other studies in the field, 
the empirical evidence does not validate the well-known Meltzer and Richard’s 
(1981) hypothesis by which progressive income redistribution is positively linked 
to the gap between the mean and the median of the pre-tax income distribution. In 
contrast, and in line with the theoretical results derived in this work, it does offer 
support for a highly statistically significant association between (i) the net group 
transfers and the income gaps, at 1% significance level, and under both OLS and FE, 
and (ii) the after-tax Gini coefficient and the electoral rule disproportionality, at 1% 
significance and under OLS.
Consistent with our theory, the data also show a statistically significant associa-
tion between the net group transfers and the power sharing index. This is confirmed 
at 1% significance level for the middle-class and the rich under OLS, and at 5% for 
the poor group under both OLS and FE. In addition, we find some evidence of a 
negative and significant (at 10%) association between the Gini and party inequality 
concern, particularly when controlling for voters’ inequality concern and partisan 
independence.
The net transfers to the poor group are also found under OLS to be empirically 
associated (at 1% significance) with party inequality concern. However, regres-
sions accounting for voters’ inequality concern and partisan independence do not 
lend almost any empirical support to their association with the net transfers and the 
Gini coefficient. Although these results are obtained from relatively smaller datasets, 
they are in line with other results in the empirical literature on targeted spending, 
which find weak evidence in validating the swing voter argument. In our case, the 
results are also consistent with the fact that fair-minded parties engage less on tacti-
cal spending.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We set up the model in Sect. 2. The 
theoretical results are in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes the hypotheses to be tested, the 
data, and the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper discussing the 
key findings and the related literature. For expositional convenience, Appendix A 
7 The online appendix also considers the Gallegher’s (1991) index, which is another well-known meas-
ure of an electoral system’s disproportionality. The results reported below and summarized in Tables 8 
and 9, Appendix B, are similar under the two specifications.
8 For the sake of conciseness, the reader is referred to Sect. 4 for further details about the data and the 
definition of the Taagepera’s (1986) index.
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collects the proofs; and Appendix B displays the countries and the years informing 
the regressions, and a brief overview of the results under the alternative econometric 
specifications considered in this work. Finally, the online appendix offers summary 
statistics, a more detailed exposition of the regressions carried out, and several theo-
retical extensions.
2  The model
2.1  Voters
Consider a continuum N of voters divided into three disjoined groups: the rich (R), 
the middle class (M), and the poor (P). Let ni ∈ (0, 1) denote the size of group i ∈ N , 
with 
∑
i∈N ni = 1 , and let i = ni∕(1 − ni) be group i’s relative size in relation to 
the other groups. Suppose ei > 0 denotes the initial income of every voter of group 
i ∈ N . Assume the income distribution is skewed to the right, with the mean income 
e =
∑
ni ei greater than the median ē , and eR > e > ē = eM > eP.
In order to represent voters’ preferences for redistribution, let  = (zi)i∈N ∈ Z be 




i∈N ni zi =
∑
i∈N ni ei } denot-
ing the set of all such allocations. The utility of a voter in group i over Z is given by
where i ∈ ℝ+ , zi (resp., zj ) denotes voter i’s (resp., j’s) income under the distribu-
tion  ∈ Z , and z =
∑
j∈N nj zj is the population mean income.
The preferences shown in equation (1) are additively separable in the voter’s con-
cern with his own well-being and his concern with the others’. The first term of the 
right-hand side denotes voter i’s selfish utility over his income zi . The second term, 
i.e., −i
∑
j∈N nj (zj − z)
2 , measures voter i’s intrinsic concern with inequality. To be 
more specific, voter i’s inequality concern is represented by the weighted sum of the 
distances between each group’s average income and the population mean, with the 
weights given by the group sizes and i . Following the data of Sect. 4.1, we assume 
that 𝛼P > 𝛼M > 𝛼R , reflecting the fact that poorer groups display a greater disutility 
from income inequality.
2.2  Political process
To eliminate any unwanted inequality associated with the initial allocation of 
resources, there is a political process that redistributes income across groups through 
a tax-and-transfer policy. Let xi ∈ ℝ denote the net transfer to voters of group i ∈ N . 
A balanced-budget redistributive policy is a vector  = (xi)i∈N ∈ ℝN such that ∑
i∈N ni xi = 0 and xi ≥ −ei for all i ∈ N . We further restrict the set of all such poli-
cies, denoted by X, to guarantee non- income-sorting. This ensures that the ranking 
(1)ui() = zi − i
∑
j∈N
nj (zj − z)
2,
1 3
Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern 
of disposable incomes yi = ei + xi after redistribution preserves the ordering of the 
initial incomes of the groups, that is, yR ≥ yM ≥ yP.9
There are two political parties, indexed by C ∈ {A,B} , that compete in an elec-
tion proposing simultaneously and independently a redistributive policy C ∈ X.10 
Like in the Lindbeck-Weibull model, each voter has a partisan bias toward the par-
ties, which is unrelated to the current policy. This preference is fixed in the short-
term, and may depend on prior political experience, attributes of the candidates, 
ideology, etc. Before the election, the political parties are unsure about the partisan 
preferences of the electorate. More precisely, they view voter i’s partisan bias i as 
being drawn from a twice continuously differentiable distribution function Fi(⋅) over 
ℝ , with a density fi(⋅) that takes a value at zero (neutral bias) of fi(0) = 𝜙i > 0.
Following data about partisan independence and the income groups taken 
from the European Social Survey and discussed in Sect.  4, we assume that 
𝜙M > 𝜙 > 𝜙P > 𝜙R , where  =
∑
ni i . These conditions on the densities imply 
that the middle class is the “swing voter group” in our model, with the highest pro-
portion of partisan independent voters, followed by the poor, and the rich.11 In addi-
tion, the second inequality, that is, 𝜙 > 𝜙P , rules out the less compelling case where 
all voters have the same after-tax equilibrium income. Finally, to prevent any group 
to be fully expropriated and be left with a non-positive after-tax income, we assume 
that 𝜙P > 𝜙 − 2𝛼𝜙 e , where  =
∑
i∈N ni i i is an average across groups reflecting 
independent voters’ inequality concern.
At the election, each voter votes sincerely for the party’s proposal that offers higher 
utility.12 Specifically, a voter of group i votes for party A if ui(A) ≥ ui(B) + i , 
where C = (yC
i
)i∈N , with yCi = ei + x
C
i
 representing group i’s after-tax income 
under the policy of party C. Given that for every group i ∈ N , the initial income 
ei is held fixed throughout the analysis, in the sequel we simply denote ui(⋅) as a 
function of C . Therefore, the probability that a voter in group i votes for party A 
given the platforms A and B is Prob (i ≤ ui(A) − ui(B)) = Fi(ui(A) − ui(B)) . 





B)) . Assuming that there is no abstention, party 
B’s vote share is simply vB = 1 − vA.
After the election, the winning party and the opposition jointly determine the 
tax-and-transfer policy  ∈ X in accord with their platforms C and their relative 
political strengths C . To be precise, we assume that  = A A + B B , where 
C = Φ(vC) denotes party C’s power share (“influence”) at the policymaking process 
9 Like in the Lindbeck-Weibull model, under income-sorting the ranking of the groups after redistribu-
tion changes in equilibrium in such a way that the rich becomes the lowest income group. This is not 
very realistic, since non-rich voters do not seem to possess in western democracies the political power to 
carry out such level of expropriation. Despite this, when income-sorting is permitted, the online appen-
dix shows that the main qualitative properties of the equilibrium transfers are similar.
10 Hereafter, it is understood that the index −C denotes B if C = A , and A if C = B.
11 Persson and Tabellini (1999) also argue in favor of thinking of the group with the highest density of 
partisan independent voters as consisting of middle class voters.
12 This entails no loss of generality because the probability of being pivotal at the election is zero given 
the continuum of voters.
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as an increasing function Φ ∶ [0, 1] → [0, 1] of party C’s vote share vC , with the 
usual requirement that B = 1 − A . The influence over policy C exerted by each 
party can be interpreted as its probability of determining alone policy  ∈ X , which 
is expected to be increasing in the party’s vote share.
Regarding the specific functional form of the power sharing rule, we follow an 
string of the literature that sees party influence over policy as being determined by 
the relative electoral strengths of the parties, represented here by the ratio of votes. 
To be precise, we assume that the power sharing rule C is given by
where the parameter  ≥ 1 represents the proportionality of the electoral rule.13
Simple algebraic manipulation shows that (2) implies that C∕−C = (vC∕v−C) , 
which is Theil’s (1969) well-known hypothesis about how vote shares translate into 
seat shares in a legislature. When  = 1 , the expression above represents the purely 
proportional representation system, where the influence of each party coincides with 
its vote share. As the parameter  rises above 1, the electoral rule gets more dispro-
portionate and biased in favour of the majority winning party.14 In the limit, as  
approaches infinity, (2) captures the winner-take-all system where the party holding 
more votes controls all branches of government and sets policy unilaterally.
To complete the model, we introduce the parties’ payoff functions, ΠC(⋅) , which 
are a combination of the interests of (i) the politicians and party leaders, who seek 
power to influence policy, and (ii) other party members and supporters, who care to 
a certain extent about the well-being of other individuals in society. Formally, the 







− e)2 , 
where  ∈ [0, 1] denotes the parties’ inequality concern.15 When  = 0 , parties 
maximize their expected vote shares. At the other extreme when  = 1 , they seek to 
achieve an egalitarian distribution of income. In between these cases, parties com-









13 An alternative to equation (2) would be to see parties’ power shares as a function of the margin of vic-
tory (or electoral mandate), instead of the ratio of votes. The qualitative results of the paper are robust to 
this alternative specification, since the equilibrium characterization under the “margin of victory” power 
sharing rule only suffers minor changes in comparison with that derived under (2). Details are omitted 
for the sake of brevity, but they are available in the online appendix.
14 For instance, when  = 3 , the seat allocation follows the “cube law”, which is seen as approximating 
the distortions created in favour of the winner party in the first-past-the-post elections.
15 Alternatively,  could be seen as a cost parameter for the party associated to campaigning on policies 
perceived as “socially insensible” (i.e., the cost of building the image of being a “nasty party” that only 
cares about the privileged few and not the many, as the British Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, put it in her 2002 party conference speech). The online appendix offers further results for the case 
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2.3  Timing
Let G = (X, ΠC)C=A,B denote the redistributive election game sketched above. The 
timing of this game is as follows. First, parties A and B propose simultaneously 
and non-cooperatively redistributive policies xA and xB , respectively. At this stage, 
parties know the initial income of the groups, voters’ preferences over the income 
distribution, and the group-specific cumulative distributions of the partisan bias, 
but not yet their realized values. Second, the actual values of i are realized and all 
uncertainty is resolved. Third, voters cast their vote for one of the parties. Fourth, 
the vote and the power shares are determined and, together with the parties’ pro-
posals, they determine the tax-and-transfer policy. Finally, fifth, parties and voters 
receive their respective payoffs.
3  Equilibrium analisis
3.1  Existence
We begin the equilibrium analysis showing that under fairly general conditions, the 
redistributive election game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. To do that, 




 be a measure of the overall con-




 . Fix C and 

−C ∈ X , and define for each group i ∈ N and for each party C’s proposal C ∈ X , 







 be the (loga-
rithmic) rate at which the rate of change of party C’s vote share vC( ⋅ , −C) varies 
within group i ∈ N in response to changes in ti(C).16 A sufficient condition for 
vC( ⋅ , −C) to be concave on X is as follows:






This condition is fulfilled in a number of meaningful cases, including the uniform 
distribution and the doubly exponential distribution (logit) case considered by Lind-
beck and Weibull (1987), the latter when the overall concavity is greater than one. 
As a passing remark, notice that in the Lindbeck-Weibull model the right-hand side 




)−1 . The reason is the cross-derivatives of the vote 
share vC( ⋅ , −C) with respect to party C’s net transfers are all null, which simplifies 
greatly its Hessian matrix. Instead, in our case due to the inequality concern, the 
marginal increase in the percentage of votes that party C obtains by changing group 
i’s transfers xC
i
 varies with the transfers xC
j
 to group j ≠ i.
Although the condition above is enough to ensure that each party’s vote share is 
concave given the policy of the other party, this is not sufficient for equilibrium 
16 For instance, in the uniform case this ratio is equal to zero, meaning that changes in the utility differ-
ential affect the vote share of each political party at a constant rate.
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existence. The reason is the parties’ payoff functions involve the power shares C , 
which are an increasing transformation Φ of vC . Therefore, in addition to ℂ1 , a 
restriction on Φ is needed to preserve the concavity of Φ(vC( ⋅ , −C)) on X. To do 
that, fix as before party C and the policy of the other party −C ∈ X . For each group 







⋅ vC(C , −C)∕xC
j
 , and 
let (vC) = Φ
��(vC)
Φ�(vC)







 , where Δk(C) , k = 1, 2, 3 , represents the determinant of the 





denote by M[i, u] the matrix obtained from M by replacing in each column of the i-th 
row the entry scalar u.
Our next condition can be formally stated as follows:






In practice, depending on the different values adopted by the main parameters of 
the model, (particularly, on i and Fi(⋅) ), Condition ℂ2 establishes an upper bound on 
the disproportionality parameter  below which the power sharing function exhib-
ited in equation (2) satisfies concavity.17 Therefore, with these two conditions ℂ1 and 
ℂ2 in place, we are now ready to state our result on equilibrium existence.
Proposition 1 If conditions ℂ1 and ℂ2 hold for each party C, then the redistributive 
election game G has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
For expositional convenience, the proof of the previous proposition is displayed 
in Appendix A, as is the proof of any other result of the paper. Our formal argu-
ment rests on the standard existence results for strategic games with a continuum 
of pure strategies. To guarantee the quasi-concavity of the conditional payoff func-
tions, we impose a sufficient condition (i.e., ℂ1 and ℂ2 ) that generalizes Lindbeck 
and Weibull’s (1987), but it is stronger due to the presence of social preferences and 
the power sharing mechanism.
3.2  Characterization
Having proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, we 
move next to the characterization of the corresponding tax-and-transfer policies, 
which allow later to derive several testable predictions that guide our empirical 
analysis.
17 By being an increasing and concave transformation of the party’s vote share, under condition ℂ
1
 the 
power share function is always concave between half and one. The restriction on  is necessary to pre-
serve concavity below half, that is, for the range of values of the vote share over which Φ is increasing 
but convex. Otherwise, if  were not constrained, it could be the case that the political parties increase 
their power sharing by reducing their percentage of votes in the election, which would eliminate the 
trade-off investigated in this paper between equity and votes.
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Proposition 2 Let (A, B) ∈ X × X denote the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the 





with 𝛽P = −
(1−𝛾) 𝜂
(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙 + 𝛾
< 0 and 𝛽M = 𝛽R =
(1−𝛾) 𝜂 𝜎P
(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙 + 𝛾
> 0.
The characterization given in Proposition 2 points out that despite the electoral 
system (that is, proportional representation, winner-take-all, or a system in between), 
the usual centripetal forces of electoral competition lead the political parties to con-
verge to a similar redistributive policy.18 More importantly, it also shows that the 
tax-and-transfer policy to which the parties converge consists of two parts:
• A first part, called egalitarian redistribution (ER), which coincides with the pol-
icy chosen by a political party concerned only with inequality, and it is equal to 
the gap between the population and the group mean initial income; and
• A second part, called tactical redistribution (TR), which captures the income 
transfers carried out by the politicians across the voter groups to increase their 
electoral support; and that depends on three main factors: (i) the partisan inde-
pendence gap of the poor, measured by the difference between the density of 
swing voters in that group and the average density in society, (ii) the proportion-
ality of the electoral rule, and (iii) parties’ and voters’ inequality concern.
The assumptions on the income distribution and on the group densities imply that 
the equilibrium transfers to the middle class are positive. For the other groups, the 
sign is indeterminate because ER and TR work in opposite directions. By playing 
with the magnitudes of these two, it could happen that either the middle class and 
the poor (resp., rich) benefit from income redistribution at the expense of the rich 
(resp., poor); or that the middle class is the only group benefiting from redistributive 
politics, a result known in the literature as Director’s law.
From the utilitarian viewpoint, the equilibrium displayed in Proposition 2 can be 
rationalized as the policy outcome obtained by maximizing a social welfare function 
that weights voters’ utilities according with the group sizes, the ex-ante distribution 
of partisan preferences, the inequality concern parameters, and the electoral rule dis-




= (e − ei)
⏟ ⏟
ER
+ i ( − P)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟
TR
, C = A,B,
18 As a note of caution, notice that our equilibrium result doesn’t produce the convergence to the median 
voter’s most-preferred policy, as is the case in the Downsian framework. It does preserve, however, the 
principle of minimum differentiation of spatial competition, which is a common feature shared by other 
election games with two symmetric parties and full commitment to the campaign proposals. The online 
appendix shows an example with asymmetric motivations (asymmetric party inequality concern) where 
the parties do not converge to the same policy. This is also a feature shared by other asymmetric election 
games, even within the Downsian model (see, for instance, Drouvelis et al. 2014).
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Corollary 1 If C ∈ X denotes party C’s equilibrium policy at the election game G , 










Besides revealing that the egalitarian part only varies (rises) with the income 
gaps, Proposition 2 offers some insight about how tactical redistribution is affected 
by the other parameters of the model. Corollaries 2–3 below collect these results.19 
To start, notice that an increase in P raises the transfers to the poor, as is indicated 
by (2.A), because they become more responsive to policy and their votes are easier 
to swing. Due to the non-income-sorting restrictions and the balanced-budget condi-
tion, both binding at the equilibrium, a greater P decreases simultaneously (and in 
the same magnitude) the total transfers received by the non-poor.
Corollary 2 Let C ∈ X denote party C’s equilibrium policy at the redistributive 


















(nP−1) 𝛾+(1−𝛾) 2𝜂 [(nP−1) 𝛼𝜙−nP 𝛼P(𝜙−𝜙P)]
(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙+ 𝛾
> 0,





ni +(1−) 2 ni [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−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(1−) 2  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 , with i = M,R.
As is shown in (2.B), the effect of a change in M (resp., R ) over xCi  is inde-
terminate, meaning that in contrast with Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), elector-
ally motivated transfers do not necessarily rise in all groups with the percentage of 
swing voters.20 On the one hand, a greater M (resp., R ) raises the average density 
of swing voters across groups, reducing the electoral appeal of the poor vis-à-vis the 
middle class. Given that the non-sorting constraint of the middle class and the rich is 
binding at the equilibrium, this reduces also the appeal of the poor vis-à-vis the rich. 
Thus, the first effect (through the rise of the partisan independence gap of the poor) 




 , and negative for xC
P
 . On the other hand, an increase in M 
(resp., R ) also increases P and reduces the coefficients M and R . This works in the 
direction opposite to the first effect, capturing how the inequality concern and power 
sharing interact with the partisan preferences. Thus, the total effect of a change of 
M (resp., R ) over xCi  is ambiguous.
The second set of comparative statics results points out that the effect of (either 
citizens’ or parties’) inequality concern over TR-transfers is negative for the middle 
class and the rich, who benefit from this type of redistribution, and positive for the 
poor (see (3.A) and (3.B) below). This means that social preferences curb to some 
extent money transfers across income groups motivated by elections. As was pointed 
out before, ER-transfers are not directly affected by inequality concern.
19 In what follows, we assume that  ≠ 1 , since otherwise group transfers consist only of egalitarian 
redistribution and they are invariant to changes in the parameters investigated.
20 This result is, however, reestablished when income-sorting is permitted. For more details, see the 
online appendix at the corresponding author’s personal web-site.
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Corollary 3 Let C ∈ X denote party C’s equilibrium policy at the redistributive 





















2 (1−𝛾)2 𝜂2 𝜎P ni 𝜙i
[(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙+𝛾]
2
< 0,










[(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙+𝛾]
2
< 0,










[(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙+𝛾]
2
> 0.
Finally, the effect of the power sharing parameter on TR-transfers is positive for 
the high density group, that is, the middle class; and due to the non-income-sort-
ing (resp., balanced-budget) constraint, it is also positive (resp., negative) for the 
rich (resp., poor). This captures that a political system that assigns policy influence 
more disproportionately among political parties rises the importance of winning a 
majority at the election, and thereby the interest of the parties in the swing voter 
group. This result resembles that derived in Persson and Tabellini (1999), according 
to which majoritarian elections make electoral competition stiffer, and that implies 
more targeted redistribution towards the politically influential middle class. In par-
ticular, (3.C) implies that tactical redistribution toward the middle class and the rich 
(resp., poor) is at the lowest (resp., highest) level under proportional representation, 
and increases (resp., decreases) smoothly as the power sharing system gets more 
disproportionate.
The closed-form expression of the tax-and-transfer policy allows also to investi-
gate the effect of the parameters of the model on income inequality after redistribu-
tion. To do that, we follow a usual method of estimating the Gini coefficient when 
data is grouped into classes. This consists in approximating the Lorenz curve by a 
series of straight lines joining the known points, and then calculating the relevant 
area as a series of trapezia and triangles. The resulting estimation, denoted Ĝ , can be 
written as
where N′ is a rearrangement of N in the order of increasing after-tax incomes, Y

 
denotes the percentage of cumulative income up until group  (with Y0 = 0 ), and 
j = i − 1 refers to the group immediate before group i in terms of its income share 
(Fuller 1979).
Corollary 4 The groups’ after-tax equilibrium incomes yi = e + i( − P) , i ∈ N , 
determine an estimate of the Gini coefficient equal to Ĝ = nP 𝛽P (𝜙P − 𝜙) e−1 . Thus,
 (4.A)  𝜕Ĝ
𝜕𝛼i
= nP (𝜙P − 𝜙) e
−1 𝜕𝛽P
𝜕𝛼i
< 0 , i ∈ N,
 (4.B)  𝜕Ĝ
𝜕𝛾




 (4.C)  𝜕Ĝ
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− ni + (𝜙 − 𝜙P)
(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 ni 𝛼i
(1−𝛾) 2 𝜂 𝛼𝜙+𝛾
]
 , i ∈ N.
The first two items of Corollary 4, that is, (4.A) and (4.B), confirm that income 
inequality decreases as society exhibits a greater inequality concern. More interest-
ingly, (4.C) reveals that the Gini estimate is positively related with the disproportion-
ately of the power sharing rule, which amount to say that income inequality rises as 
policymaking power gets more concentrated in the majority winning party. Finally, the 
swing voter effect over the Gini, given by (4.D), is negative for the poor, since the term 
in square brackets is positive and 𝛽P < 0 . This is pretty intuitive, since a larger den-
sity of independent voters within the poor induces more transfers to the group at the 
expense of both the rich and the middle class. For these two groups, the sign of (4.D) 
depends on the parameters of the model and it is therefore indeterminate.
4  Empirical evidence
The main purpose of this section is to assess empirically the equilibrium predictions 
derived above. To be more specific, we aim to test the following list of hypotheses, 
conveniently summarized in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1 The net transfers to all income groups increase with the gap between 
the population and the group average pre-tax income.
Hypothesis 2 The net transfers to the poor (resp., non-poor): 
 (2.A) rise (resp., decrease) with the percentage of independent voters among the poor;
 (2.B) increase (resp., decrease) with voters’ and parties’ inequality concern;
 (2.C) decrease (resp., increase) with power sharing disproportionality.
Hypothesis 3 The Gini coefficient associated with the distribution of after-tax dis-
posable incomes: 
 (3.A) decreases with the percentage of independent voters among the poor;
 (3.B) decreases with voters’ and parties’ inequality concern;
 (3.C) rises with the disproportionality of the power sharing rule.
4.1  Data
The data employed to carry out the econometric tests is as follows.21 On the one 
hand, to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2, we use as regressands the real net public 
21 For brevity, the control variables used in the regressions are described in the online appendix.
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transfers received by the three income groups, defined according to micro-data and 
procedure standards provided by LIS, and taking exchange rates and deflators from 
the Penn World Table (PWT) of Feenstra et al. (2015). On the other hand, to assess 
Hypothesis 3, the dependent variable is the most widely used measure of income 
inequality, namely, the Gini index, taken from the Key Figures of LIS, which pro-
vides high quality data.
Given the ability of governments to manipulate different components of the pub-
lic transfers and taxes, we consider three empirical approximations to the group 
transfers. First, we consider a broad measure, given by the social security transfers 
minus the sum of the social security contributions and the income taxes. Second, 
we consider a narrow definition, given by the public assistance transfers minus the 
income taxes. Finally, third, we consider a moderate version of the transfers, given 
by the social security transfers minus the income taxes and the old-age (public insur-
ance and universal) pensions. This moderate definition results in a very small sam-
ple of country-year observations, so we leave it out of the analysis.
The individual market income is derived from the disposable household income 
by subtracting the net transfers, in their broad and narrow definitions. The market 
income, disposable income, and the public transfers are all expressed in equiva-
lent terms, following the LIS procedure of dividing each nominal quantity by the 
square root of the household size. All figures are expressed in thousands of 2005 
USD per year, using (LCU/USD) exchange rates and (US) price levels from PWT. 
We define the poor applying the widely used series of EU-SILC risk-of-poverty 
lines. In the data presented below, a poor household is one with equivalized market 
income below 70% of the country- and year-specific median income. The individu-
als in the top decile of equivalized incomes are classified as rich. The remaining 
individuals constitute the middle class.22 For the three groups, we aggregate the 
market incomes, disposable incomes, and the public transfers in each country and 
year using the population weights present in LIS.
To test the hypotheses involving the electoral rule disproportionality, we employ 
the Taagepera’s (1986) index, which is built by dividing the logarithm of the total 
number of voters by the logarithm of the total number of parliamentary seats, and 
powering the result to the inverse of the mean electoral district magnitude. This 
index runs from 1 (proportional representation) to infinity (winner-take-all), with 
higher values indicating that policymaking power is more disproportionately allo-
cated among the political parties, just as the theory of Sect. 2 postulates. To con-
struct the index, data on the total number of votes for each election and country is 
collected from IDEA.23 On the other hand, the total number of seats (and respec-
tively, the electoral district magnitudes) are gathered from the Manifesto Project 
Dataset (MPDS) of Volkens et al. (2015) (and respectively, from Carey and Hix’s 
(2011) data set).
22 In the online appendix, we offer sensitivity analysis on the group definitions following all the other 
risk-of-poverty lines used by EU-SILC.
23 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Database, (multiple countries; 
1945–2014). Stockholm: IDEA. Web address: http://www.idea.int/db.
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The main explanatory variables in Hypotheses (2.B) and (3.B) are voters’ and 
parties’ concern with inequality. To approximate the former, we consider biannual 
micro-data from the European Social Survey (ESS), for the period 2002-2014 (seven 
rounds), where each respondent is asked the extent to which a person stating that it 
is “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities” is like 
him.24 Our measure of voters’ concern toward inequality is generated in such a way 
that it focuses on respondents who have voted in the last election previous to the 
survey. It takes a value of 1 if the voter answers “very much like me”; 0 if she or 
he answers “not like me” (or “not like me at all”); and 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75, respec-
tively, if she or he answers “a little like me”, “somewhat like me”, and “like me”.
For the first three waves of the ESS, where incomes are classified in Euro-denom-
inated brackets, we assume a uniform distribution inside these brackets to re-clas-
sify individuals into country- and year-specific income deciles, consistently with 
the classification in ESS from wave four. Once we have all individuals classified 
in income deciles, we assign those in the top decile to the rich group and, using 
the country-specific relative poverty rates from EU-SILC, we identify the poor. The 
middle class is determined once again as the residual of these two groups. We finally 
obtain our group measure of inequality concern as the weighted average, inside each 
income group, of the respondents’ values. The results from the t-Student test sug-
gest that inequality concern is significantly higher (at 10% confidence level) for the 
poor group than for the middle class. In addition, the middle class displays higher 
inequality concern than the rich, even when the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant under the usual significance levels.
Table 1  Effects of the 
parameters over the net transfers 
and the Gini
Net transfers ( x
i
) Gini
Poor MC Rich (Ĝ)
Income gap of the poor ( e − e
P
) +
Income gap of the MC ( e − e
M
) +
Income gap of the rich ( e − e
R
) +
Partisan Independence of the poor ( 
P
) + − − −
Inequality concern of the poor ( 
P
) + −
Inequality concern of the MC ( 
M
) − −
Inequality concern of the rich ( 
R
) − −
Party inequality concern ( ) + − − −
Electoral rule disproportionality ( ) − + + +
24 A strength of ESS data is that it includes responses to the same questions from people in a large num-
ber of European and associated countries, and has systematic sample weights to make the data nationally 
representative. This facilitates inter-country comparisons, and makes it possible to relate differences in 
attitudes across countries to country-specific factors.
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Regarding the parties’ inequality concern, we build an index going from 0 to 1 
based on the MPDS question at the party level (per503 Social Justice: Positive).25 
This gathers information about the need for fair treatment of all people; the special 
protection for the underprivileged; the need for fair distribution of resources; the 
removal of class barriers; the end of discrimination of racial and sexual nature, etc. 
We normalize the data to have a minimum of zero and a maximum of 1, and we 
calculate an average over the parties weighting each of them by their respective vote 
share in the election.
Finally, to assess Hypotheses (2.A) and (3.A), we construct a measure of partisan 
independence within each income group. First, we elicit each respondent’s partisan 
bias by looking at a question in the ESS questionnaire where the subject is asked 
how close to the parties she or he feels. Our measure of the voter’s partisan inde-
pendence takes a value of 1 if she or he does not feel close to any party; 0 if she or 
he feels very close to a party; 0.25 if she or he feels quite close to a party; and 0.50 
(and resp, 0.75) if she or he feels closer to one party than to all the others, but does 
not feel close to that party (and resp., at all). We obtain then our measure of group 
partisan independence using the same aggregation procedure applied for the voters’ 
inequality concern.
To investigate the difference between the means of these distributions among our 
three income groups, we perform unpaired (two sample) t-Student tests, on sam-
ples with 155 country-year observations. The null hypothesis is that the population 
means related to two independent and random samples from approximately normal 
distributions (allowing for unequal variances) are equal. The results from the tests 
suggest that, while the average partisan independence of the poor and the middle-
class are not statistically different, the rich group has an index of partisan independ-
ence significantly lower (at 1% significance level) than the other two groups.
Besides the definitions and the data sources described above, further details 
about the structure of our data are as follows. The variables provided by LIS are 
observed for several years and with different sparsity, as is shown in Table 7. The 
variables underlying both the Taagepera index and the parties’ inequality concern 
are observed for each election, and they are assumed to be constant during the office 
term. The voters’ values, i.e., inequality concern and partisan independence, are 
observed every two years, in accordance with the ESS. The rest of the variables are 
observed on a yearly basis.26
25 In the online appendix, we present results for an alternative index of the parties’ inequality concern 
that combines the one we present here with MPDS-per504: “Favourable mentions of need to introduce, 
maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme”.
26 Within the control variables (described in the online appendix), schooling and the age of democracy 
are linearly interpolated for the years with missing data within the range of observed data points.
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4.2  Empirical estimations
Since the data in this work are grouped into clusters of countries, the estimations 
displayed below control for the presence of within-cluster correlated errors.27 To do 
that, we rely on the method proposed by Cameron and Miller (2015). This consists 
in estimating first the regression model with no control for within-cluster error cor-
relation; and then in obtaining post-estimation the “cluster-robust” standard errors, 
which allow for correlated and heteroscedastic errors. Given the relatively small 
number of clusters that we have, we follow the authors’ suggestion and we use t-Stu-
dent critical values to base our inferences.
Apart from controlling for within-cluster correlated errors, notice that regressing 
the net group transfers using every parameter involved in the equilibrium characteri-
zation of Sect. 3 severely restricts the number of observations available in our sam-
ple. Thus, we proceed by regressing in the first place the net transfers on the income 
gaps, the parties’ inequality concern, and the electoral rule disproportionality. This 
allows us to work with more than 100 country-year observations. The results from 
these regressions are displayed in Table 2. Like in the rest of the tables discussed 
below, the online appendix shows that most of these results are robust to several 
alternative specifications of the econometric model and/or definitions of the main 
variables employed in the regressions.28
Overall, the estimations above suggest that there exists a positive and highly sta-
tistically significant association between each group’s income gap and the net trans-
fers that the group receives, offering empirical support to Hypothesis 1. This posi-
tive association is found using not only OLS, but also FE. That is, it is present even 
when we ignore the between-country variability of the observed variables and we 
conduct the estimations exploiting only the within-country variability.
In the OLS case, Table 2 also shows that higher electoral rule disproportionality 
is statistically associated with greater transfers to the middle-class and the rich, and 
with lower transfers to the poor (Hypothesis 2.C). Regarding the corresponding FE 
estimations, which rely on an smaller within-country variability of the independent 
variable, the results have the expected sign and they are statistically significant only 
for the transfers to the poor. Finally, the OLS results show that higher party inequal-
ity concern is statistically associated with greater transfers to the poor, providing 
some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2.B. Moreover, even when the transfers to the 
middle-class increase (instead of decrease) with the party inequality concern, for a 
given unit rise in the inequality concern, the average increase in the transfers to the 
poor group is much higher.29 Thus, a rise of parties’ inequality concern does appear 
27 When regression errors are correlated within clusters, standard errors for the estimated coefficients 
overstate the precision of the estimators, leading to over-accept the hypotheses under analysis.
28 The reader is referred to Appendix B for a general overview of the robustness analysis carried out and 
its corresponding results. A more detailed discussion is also available in the online appendix.
29 The OLS coefficients in Table  2 imply that if the parties’ inequality concern rises in one unit, the 






 ) more than the transfers to the middle-class.
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to be associated with a smaller gap between the after-tax incomes of the non-poor 
and the poor group, as predicted by the theory.
When considering our narrower definition of the transfers, the regressions offer 
further support for Hypothesis 1, with both estimators providing positive and highly 
significant estimates for the effect of the income gaps on the net transfers to the 
groups, as is shown in Table 3. However, the support for Hypothesis 2.B vanishes; 
and that for Hypothesis 2.C is relatively more limited. That is, the association 
between the group transfers and the electoral rule disproportionality not only holds 
with statistical significance in the OLS case, but also the disproportionality of the 
rule increases the transfers to the three groups. Having said that, for a given unit 
rise in the electoral rule disproportionality, the average increase in the transfer to 
the poor is much lower than the increase in the transfer to the middle-class, which 
is in turn significantly lower than the transfer to the rich.30 Thus, consistent with the 
theory, even with a narrow measure of the net transfers, a rise of the electoral rule 
disproportionality is associated with a greater gap between the after-tax incomes of 
the non-poor and the poor group.
Next, we reexamine our hypotheses including in the regressions voters’ inequality 
concern and partisan independence. This limits significantly the sample size and it 
constrains the analysis to OLS. The results provided in Table 4 confirms the empiri-
cal support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.C, though the link between the net transfers to 
the middle-class and the electoral rule disproportionality lacks statistical signifi-
cance. In favor of Hypothesis 2.A, we do find that the partisan independence of the 
poor is positively associated with the net transfers to the group, but without sig-
nificance. Regarding Hypothesis 2.B, voters’ inequality concerns (holding their pre-
transfer income constant) are not significantly associated with the expected sign to 
the net transfers of the groups.
To complete the analysis and before considering the Gini, we look at the group 
transfers taking the alternative view of Meltzer and Richard (1981), by which pro-
gressive redistribution depends positively on the skew of the pre-tax income dis-
tribution. Specifically, we analyze if the net transfers to the poor and the middle-
class (and resp., the rich) depends positively (and resp., negatively) on the skew 
of the income distribution, determined in the Key Figures of LIS by the mean to 
median ratio. Table 5 shows that the evidence found is rather inconsistent with this 
hypothesis.
To elaborate, with OLS the net transfers to the poor are decreasing rather than 
increasing on the mean to median ratio; and there is no statistically significant asso-
ciation between the skew of the distribution and the transfers to the middle-class 
(and, resp., the rich). With FE, the effect of the skew on the net transfers to the rich 
is negative and significant (as the theory predicts), but its effects on the net transfers 
to the poor and the middle-class are not statistically significant. Thus, both OLS and 
30 The OLS coefficients in Table  3 imply that if the electoral rule disproportionality increases in one 
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Table 2  Net transfers (full sample)
Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
R
2 is adjusted-R2 for OLS, and within-R2 for FE.
OLS regressions include dummies on real per capita income (p.c.i.) identifying: (i) countries with real 
p.c.i. between 15K and 20K USD PPP 2005, and (ii) countries with real p.c.i. above 20K.
FE regressions include a set of country-specific dummies
*p < 0.10 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01.
Least squares (OLS) Fixed effects (FE)
Poor MC Rich Poor MC Rich










































N 113 113 113 113 113 113
FE groups – – – 23 23 23
R
2 0.86 0.69 0.84 0.87 0.46 0.85
Table 3  Net transfers (narrow definition & full sample)
Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
R
2 is adjusted-R2 for OLS, and within-R2 for FE.
OLS regressions include dummies identifying: i) countries with real p.c.i. between 15K and 20K USD 
PPP 2005, and ii) countries with real p.c.i. above 20K.
FE regressions include a set of country-specific dummies
*p < 0.10 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01.
Least squares (OLS) Fixed effects (FE)
Poor MC Rich Poor MC Rich










































N 90 90 90 90 90 90
FE groups – – – 19 19 19
R
2 0.32 0.43 0.71 0.47 0.25 0.83
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Table 4  Net transfers (small sample)
Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses
Regressions include dummies identifying: i) countries with real p.c.i. between 15K and 20K USD PPP 
2005, and ii) countries with real p.c.i. above 20K
*p < 0.10 ; **:p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01.
Poor Middle class Rich












































N 27 27 27
Adjusted-R2 0.87 0.73 0.91
Table 5  Net transfers (Meltzer-Richard’s hypothesis & full sample)
Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
R
2 is adjusted-R2 for OLS, and within-R2 for FE.
FE regressions include a set of country-specific dummies
*p < 0.10 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01.
Least Squares (OLS) Fixed Effects (FE)
Poor MC Rich Poor MC Rich










































N 120 120 120 120 120 120
FE groups – – – 27 27 27
R
2 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.05 0.18
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FE offer a priori evidence against progressive redistribution being simply explained 
by the skew of the pre-tax income distribution.31
Turning to the impact on the after-tax income inequality, subject to the controls 
enumerated in Table 6, the evidence from OLS regressions offers strong support for 
Hypothesis 3.C, suggesting a positive and highly significant association between 
the Gini index and power sharing disproportionality. These results are displayed in 
column (1) and column (3) of Table 6. In the full sample, that is, column (1), this 
evidence arises from 26 different countries and 171 country-year observations. The 
coefficient of the independent variable suggests that, other things equal, the effect of 
power sharing on income inequality has a sensitivity of about 0.3 points in the Gini 
Table 6  Gini coefficient
Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
R
2 is adjusted-R2 for OLS, and within-R2 for FE.
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 control for real GDP p.c. and its square, % of the population with com-
pleted secondary school, age of democracy, trade openness, population size, and % of the population 
between 15 and 64, and over 65. Regression in column 3 controls for real GDP p.c., completed secondary 
school, trade openness, and population structure.
FE regressions include a set of country-specific dummies
*p < 0.10 ; **p < 0.05 ; ***p < 0.01.
Full sample Small sample
OLS FE




























N 171 171 30
FE groups – 26 –
R
2 0.41 0.22 0.79
31 A number of reasons have been suggested to explain why the Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis 
has met with mixed evidence in the data. Among them, it is argued that rising inequality might allow the 
very rich to exert more influence on the political views of the less affluent and the politicians. Rising ine-
quality might also lower the turnout more among the less affluent, which is sometimes referred to as dis-
enfranchisement of the poor. As a consequence, the pivotal voter might not be the median in the income 
distribution, but a richer individual. Finally, the median voter argument that lies behind the Meltzer and 
Richard’s idea only holds when politics is one-dimensional. However, elections deal with several other 
issues besides redistribution (e.g., religion, race, nationalism, immigration, etc.); and even redistribution 
is, as noted by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), a multi-dimensional matter.
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index for each 0.1 point of increase in the Taagepera index. The corresponding FE 
estimator in column (2) also suggests a positive (and even higher) effect of power 
sharing on the Gini, but without statistical significance (due presumably to the low 
within-country variability of both, the Gini and the Taagepera indices).
As can be seen in column (3) of Table 6, including in the regression the voters’ con-
cern with inequality and the partisan independence of the poor restricts the sample to 
merely 30 observations. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from this regression should 
be taken just as preliminary evidence deserving further investigation. The estimation 
does not offer support to Hypothesis 3.A. However, it does provides evidence on rich 
voters’ and parties’ inequality concern be significantly associated with the after-tax 
income inequality (Hypothesis 3.B). In the case of the latter, which has the greater sta-
tistical significance, a movement from the lowest to the highest value of party inequal-
ity concern observed in the sample, (namely, from 0.005 for Hungary in 2005 to 0.495 
for Finland in 1995), generates an estimated reduction in the Gini of about 6.2 points. 
The variation in the Gini also appears to be fairly well explained, with a R2 coefficient 
of 0.79. Like in the other cases, the F-statistics (not tabulated) indicate that none of 
these models can be rejected on any conventional significance level.
5  Discussion
In this paper, we have reexamined the problem of income redistribution in a model of 
political competition with power sharing and inequality concern. We have character-
ized the equilibrium net transfers to the income groups and shown that they consist of 
two parts, called egalitarian and tactical redistribution. We have also shown how these 
transfers vary with their main determinants, that is, with the gap between the popu-
lation and the group average pre-tax incomes, the partisan independence gap of the 
poor, electoral rule disproportionality, and parties’ and voters’ concern with inequality. 
In particular, the theoretical and the empirical results suggest that the net transfers to 
the more responsive group of voters (i.e., the middle class) and the after-tax Gini index 
both rise as policymaking power gets more concentrated in the majority winning party.
These results add to the literature on “targeted spending” (Cox and McCubbins 
1986; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1995 and Dixit and Lon-
dregan 1996), which has been used in the study of the size and the scope of public 
spending, social security, regional transfers, etc. (Persson and Tabellini 2000). Our 
work contributes in two fronts. The theory fills a gap in the current models by ana-
lysing electoral redistribution under a large variety of power sharing arrangements 
and in the presence of social preferences. The empirical part adds to the previous 
work by looking at income redistribution among different socio-economic groups, 
instead of focusing on inter-governmental transfers to sub-national regions (prov-
inces, counties, etc.), as much of the literature does.
Additionally, our empirical approach differs from other papers in that we employ 
survey data to construct direct measures of voters’ and parties’ characteristics, 
instead of using exit polling data or data from the past elections to approximate 
the proportion of swing voters in the different geographical districts (Arulampalam 
et al. 2009; Cox 2010; Larcinese et al. 2013). This strategy is problematic because 
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voting behaviour is endogenous by assumption to electoral targeted spending, and 
it can therefore lead to biased estimates. We expect the endogeneity bias to be less 
significant in our case because the correlation of survey data with voting behaviour 
in recent elections isn’t expected to be high.
Our research also contributes to the literature on redistribution and other-regard-
ing preferences. Within the Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model of redistributive 
politics, preferences for redistribution have been studied in Galasso (2003), Alesina 
and Angeletos (2005a, b), Tyran and Sausgruber (2006), Dhami and al-Nowaihi 
(2010a, b), Luttens and Valfort (2012), and Flamand (2012). In the context of the 
probabilistic voting model, to our knowledge the only article that incorporates pref-
erences for fairness is Alesina et al. (2012). The latter analyzes a dynamic extension 
of the Lindbeck-Weibull model with a winner-take-all election at the end of each 
period. The aim of the paper is to show how different perceptions of fairness of the 
market outcomes can lead to different steady states of redistribution and growth. Our 
paper complements Alesina et al. (2012) by analyzing theoretically and empirically 
the consequences of different distributions of policymaking power over the redis-
tributive policies and income inequality. By being dynamic, Alesina et al.’s (2012) 
framework isn’t appropriate for that goal due to the lack of an accepted theory about 
how political power sharing evolves over time.
Finally, our work also adds to the literature on redistribution and inequality under 
different electoral rules (namely, first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional repre-
sentation (PR)). A central prediction is that PR favors spending on goods that benefit 
broad social groups, whereas FPTP favors spending on goods provided to specific 
subsets of voters (Persson and Tabellini 1999; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Milesi-
Ferretti et al. 2002; and Funk and Gathmann 2013). To our knowledge, this paper 
constitutes the first attempt to bring this insight into a framework with a rich variety 
of mixed electoral systems, which not only reflects better the reality of many democ-
racies, but it also allows to quantify the effects of small changes in these rules over 
both redistribution and the Gini.32
Appendix A: Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proporsition  1 To show that G = (X, ΠC)C=A,B has a unique pure-strategy 
equilibrium, we employ Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan’s existence result. First, note that 
the strategy space X is non-empty, compact, and convex. Second, each function 
ΠC(A, B) is continuous on (A, B) ∈ X2 . Thus, it remains to prove that, under con-
ditions ℂ1 and ℂ2 , each conditional payoff function ΠC( ⋅ , −C) is strictly quasi-con-
cave on X.
Fix any policy B ∈ X , and consider the resulting conditional payoff function 
ΠA( ⋅ , 
B
) of party A. The proof for party B is similar. Note that the second term of 







− e)2 , is strictly concave in 
the party’s own strategy. Thus, to prove that ΠA( ⋅ , B) is strictly quasi-concave on X, 
it suffices to show that the power share function A(A, B) is concave in A.
32 For a comparative analysis of mixed electoral systems, see Moser and Scheiner (2004).
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�−1 , condition ℂ1 
guarantees that each vA
i
( ⋅ , 
B
) is concave on X.
Finally, we use condition ℂ2 , and we show that the concavity of vA( ⋅ , 
B
) proved 
above is preserved under the increasing transformation Φ , establishing the desired 
result that the power share function A( ⋅ , B) is also concave on X. To do that, recall 
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fore, given that Φ� > 0 , it follows that
which results by applying condition ℂ2 in the Hessian matrix of A( ⋅ , 
B
) to be neg-
ative semi-definite on X.   ◻
Proof of Proporsition  2 First, notice that equilibrium symmetry (i.e., A = B ) fol-
lows from the fact that, given the policy of the other party, both political organiza-
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Without loss of generality, consider next party A’s problem. The Lagrange function 

































) , where  , i , 1 and 2 are the multipliers associated with 
the constraints listed in (5)-(8). Consider first the case where 𝜆 > 0 , i = 0 for all 
i ∈ N , 𝜓1 > 0 , and 2 = 0 . Under this configuration of values of the Lagrange mul-
tipliers, the system of first-order conditions reduces to (6) and (8) together with the 
following equations:
Moreover, since A = B , the vote share of party A is 1/2, implying that
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where D = (1 − )2 +  . Notice that from (11) and (14), it also follows that
Combining (15) and (16) together with (13),
Substituting (13) and (17) into (12), we get the transfer to the middle class, namely, 
xA
M
= e − eM + M( − P) , where M =
(1−)  P
(1−) 2   + 
 and P =
nP
1−nP
 . The transfer to 
the rich and the poor are obtained by replacing xA
M
 into (13) and (17), respectively. 
Moreover, using (16), we have that  = (1 − ) , which is strictly positive as 
required. Finally, it’s easy to verify that these critical values of xA
i
 satisfy (6) and (8). 
Therefore, they constitute the solution of party’s A constrained optimization prob-
lem. It is left for the reader to check that any other configuration of values of the 
Lagrange multipliers violates one or more of the first-order conditions.   ◻
Proof of Corollary 1 Without loss of generality, we show the result for party A. Recall 






− yA)2 with 
respect to A ∈ X subject to the constraints listed in (5, 6, 7, 8). The first part of ΠA , 
i.e., maximizing (1 − )A , is equivalent to maximizing (1 − ) 
∑
i∈N ni fi(0) ui(
A) , 
because these two have the same first-order partial derivatives, namely,
With regard to the second part of party A’s payoff function, notice first that the sum 
of voters’ utility functions 
∑
i∈N ni ui is
where ?̂? =
∑
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Appendix B: Empirical Appendix
This section displays additional information that complement Sect.  4. More pre-
cisely, Table  7 offers details about the observations informing the regressions of 
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respectively, coming from the alternative specifications of the econometric models 
examined in the online appendix.33
Besides the baseline model discussed in Sect. 4, to assess the robustness of the 
results, we consider in the online appendix six alternative models. The first replaces 
Table 7  Number of observations and years by country in the regressions with the full sample
T (G) means that data is present only for the Net Transfers (the Gini)
Country Transfers Gini Years
Australia 8 8 1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 2003 2008 2010
Austria 1 6 1987(G) 1994(G) 1995(G) 1997(G) 2000(G) 2004
Belgium 0 6 1985(G) 1988(G) 1992(G) 1995(G) 1997(G) 2000(G)
Canada 12 12 1971 1975 1981 1987 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 2004 2007 
2010
Czech Republic 5 5 1996 2002 2004 2007 2010
Denmark 7 7 1987 1992 1995 2000 2004 2007 2010
Estonia 0 4 2000(G) 2004(G) 2007(G) 2010(G)
Finland 3 7 1987(G) 1991(G) 1995(G) 2000(G) 2004 2007 2010
France 2 7 1978(G) 1984(G) 1989(G) 1994(G) 2000(G) 2005 2010
Germany 4 5 1994(G) 2000 2004 2007 2010
West Germany 4 6 1973(G) 1978(G) 1981 1983 1984 1989
Greece 3 5 1995(G) 2000(G) 2004 2007 2010
Hungary 0 6 1991(G) 1994(G) 1999(G) 2005(G) 2007(G) 2009(G)
Ireland 4 8 1987 1994(G) 1995(G) 1996(G) 2000(G) 2004 2007 2010
Israel 2 0 1992(T) 2001(T)
Italy 3 11 1986(G) 1987(G) 1989(G) 1991(G) 1993(G) 1995(G) 1998(G) 
2000(G) 2004 2008 2010
Japan 1 1 2008
Netherlands 4 8 1983(G) 1987(G) 1990(G) 1993(G) 1999 2004 2007 2010
Norway 8 8 1979 1986 1991 1995 2000 2004 2007 2010
Poland 5 6 1992(G) 1995 1999 2004 2007 2010
Romania 0 1 1997(G)
Slovakia 1 4 1996(G) 2004(G) 2007(G) 2010
Spain 3 8 1980(G) 1985(G) 1990(G) 1995(G) 2000(G) 2004 2007 2010
Sweden 8 7 1967(T) 1975 1981 1987 1992 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland 5 5 1982 1992 2000 2002 2004
United Kingdom 11 10 1969(T) 1974 1979 1986 1991 1994 1995 1999 2004 2007 
2010
United States 10 10 1974 1979 1986 1991 1994 1997 2000 2004 2007 2010
Total No Observations 114 171
33 Along Tables  8 and 9, a cell with a % figure indicates the statistical significance with which the 
hypothesis under analysis is confirmed. A cell with the word ‘sign’ indicates that the sign of the coef-
ficient validates the hypothesis, but without statistical significance. Finally, a cell with a dash ‘-’ symbol 
indicates that the sign of the coefficient does not validate the hypothesis under analysis.
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Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern 
the Taagepera index in the baseline model for another widely used index of the elec-
toral rule disproportionality, called the Gallagher index. The second considers a 
nonlinear approximation to the relationships under analysis. These regressions take 
the natural logarithm of the parameters present in the tactical redistribution term, 
reflecting that some of the parameters in Proporsition 2 affect the equilibrium values 
in a nonlinear way.
The third model examines a broader definition of the parties’ inequality concern, 
combining with equal weights the one discussed in Sect. 4, that is, MPDS–per503, 
with MPDS–per504: “Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand 
any public social service or social security scheme”. Finally, the fourth, fifth, and 
sixth model, respectively, consider alternative definitions of the income groups, 
which results from employing the other risk-of-poverty lines used by EU-SILC, 
namely, 40, 50, and 60 percent of the median income.
For the sake of conciseness, Tables 8 and 9 only display a general overview of the 
results obtained in each of these alternative models, including the baseline case of 
Sect. 4, relegating a more detailed discussion of them to the online appendix.
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